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Abstract: The scope of human consciousness includes states departing from what most of us experience
as ordinary wakefulness. These altered states of consciousness constitute a prime opportunity to study
how global changes in brain activity relate to different varieties of subjective experience. We consider
the problem of explaining how global signatures of altered consciousness arise from the interplay
between large-scale connectivity and local dynamical rules that can be traced to known properties of
neural tissue. For this purpose, we advocate a research program aimed at bridging the gap between
bottom-up generative models of whole-brain activity and the top-down signatures proposed by theories
of consciousness. Throughout this paper, we define altered states of consciousness, discuss relevant
signatures of consciousness observed in brain activity, and introduce whole-brain models to explore
the mechanisms of altered consciousness from the bottom-up. We discuss the potential of our proposal
in view of the current state of the art, give specific examples of how this research agenda might play
out, and emphasise how a systematic investigation of altered states of consciousness via bottom-up
modelling may help us better understand the biophysical, informational, and dynamical underpinnings
of consciousness.
Keywords: whole-brain models; altered states of consciousness; signatures of consciousness; integrated
information theory; psychedelics
1. Introduction
Consciousness has been for centuries a puzzle beyond the scope of natural science; however,
the significant progress seen during the last 30 years of research suggests that a rigorous scientific
understanding of consciousness is possible [1–3]. The dawn of the modern scientific approach to
consciousness can be traced back to Crick and Koch’s proposal for identifying the neural correlates of
consciousness (NCC) [4,5], understood as the minimal set of neural events associated with certain subjective
experience. The key intuition that fuels this proposal is that careful experimentation should suffice to reveal
brain events that are systematically associated with conscious (as opposed to unconscious or subliminal)
perception. Needless to say, the methodological challenges associated with this idea are vast – particularly
concerning the determination of what constitutes conscious content (e.g. must content be explicitly
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reported, or are other less direct forms of inference equally valid? [6,7]). Despite these problems, the
program put forward by Crick and Koch succeeded to jump-start contemporary consciousness research.1
While the quest for the NCC aims to provide answers to where and when consciousness occurs in
the brain, subsequent theoretical efforts have attempted to discover systematic signatures within those
NCC that could reflect key mechanisms underlying the emergence of consciousness. In other words,
these efforts try to answer how consciousness emerges from the processes that give rise to the NCC
[12,13]. Hence, theoretical models of consciousness strive to "compress" our empirical knowledge of the
NCC, i.e. to provide rules that can predict when and where from how. The nature of those rules, in turn,
determines the kind of explanation offered by a theoretical model of consciousness. Here we consider
two possible approaches: top-down and bottom-up [14]. On the one hand, top-down approaches start by
identifying high-level signatures of consciousness, and then try to narrow down low-level biophysical
mechanisms compatible with those signatures. On the other hand, bottom-up approaches build from
dynamical rules of elementary units (such as neurons or groups of neurons [15]), and attempt to provide
quantitative predictions by exploring the aggregated consequences of these rules across various temporal
and spatial scales. We further subdivide explanations into those addressing conscious information access
(e.g. perception in different sensory modalities) and those concerning consciousness as a temporally
extended state, such as wakefulness, sleep, anaesthesia, and the altered states that can be elicited by
pharmacological manipulation [16–22].
Our objective is to put forward a research program for the development of bottom-up explanations for
the relationship between brain activity and states of consciousness, which we claim is underrepresented
both in past and current research. Theories that rely heavily on a top-down perspective risk being
under-determined in the reductive sense; i.e. they could be compatible with multiple and potentially
divergent lower-level biological and physical mechanisms [23]. While we do not know whether
consciousness may be instantiated in other physical systems, we certainly do know that it is instantiated
in the human brain, and therefore all theoretical models of consciousness should be consistent with
the low-level biophysical details of the brain to be considered acceptable. In light of this potential
under-determination, it is difficult to decide whether the different theories currently dominating the field
are competing (in the sense of predicting mutually contradictory empirical findings) or convergent (in
spite of being formulated from disparate perspectives). Without investigating theories of consciousness
from the bottom-up, it could be simply too early for proposals of an experimentum crucis to decide between
candidates [24].
In this paper we posit that computational models can play a crucial role in determining the low-level
physical and biological mechanisms fulfilling the high-level phenomenological and computational
constraints of theoretical models of consciousness. The idea that consciousness is intrinsically dependent
on the dynamics of neural activity is not new, and in this sense we follow the trail of pioneers such as Walter
J. Freeman [25], Francisco Varela [26], and Gerald Edelman [27], among others. However, our proposal
reaches further than these previous attempts by building upon the technological and conceptual advances
accumulated over the last decades. In particular, the widespread availability of non-invasive neuroimaging
methods (fMRI, DTI, MEG) has expanded our knowledge of the functional and structural aspects of
the brain, while the development of connectomics has revealed the intricate meso- and macroscopic
connectivity patterns that wire cortical and subcortical structures together [28]. Moreover, for the first time
there is sufficient empirical data and computational power available to construct whole-brain models with
real predictive power [15,29,30], which represents a radical improvement over past research efforts. We
1 For recent reviews on the empirical search for NCC see Ref. [8], for a theoretical examination of the concept of NCC see Ref. [9],
and for criticism to the concept of NCC see Refs. [10,11].
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expect that these advances will enable us to compare the predictions of theories of consciousness by means
of whole-brain computational models that can be directly contrasted with empirical results.
In the following, we adopt and explore the consequences of this perspective. Our proposal and
its justification are structured as follows. First, Section 2 describes several examples of altered states
of consciousness and briefly discusses some proposed general definitions. Next, Section 3 introduces
top-down approaches for quantifying and classifying states of consciousness solely from functional
data. Then, Section 4 introduces the main technical ideas underlying the development of whole-brain
computational models, highlighting novel results with special emphasis on those informing research on
altered states of consciousness. Section 5 discusses how computational models can contribute to overcome
open challenges and conceptual difficulties, thus providing new insights into the study of altered states of
consciousness. Finally, Section 6.1 elaborates on possible future directions of research stemming from our
proposal.
2. What is an altered state of consciousness? Examples and defining features
A basic distinction is commonly drawn between phenomenal and access consciousness [31]. The
first represents the subjective experience of sensory perception, emotion, thoughts, etc.; in other words,
what it feels like to perceive something, undergo a certain emotion, or engage in a certain thought process.
The second represents the global availability of conscious content for cognitive functions such as speech,
reasoning, and decision-making, enabling the capacity to issue first-person reports.
The term "consciousness" is also used in reference to a third concept whose definition is comparatively
more elusive: that of temporally extended and qualitatively distinct modes or states of consciousness
[16–22]. This concept is perhaps best introduced by listing examples, such as our ordinary state of conscious
wakefulness, the different phases of the wake-sleep cycle, dreaming during rapid eye movement (REM)
sleep, sedation and general anaesthesia, post-comatose disorders such as the unresponsive wakefulness
syndrome, the acute effects of certain drugs (mainly serotonergic psychedelics and glutamatergic
dissociatives), the state achieved in some contemplative traditions by means of meditation, hypnosis, and
shamanic trance, among others. Following Ludwig [20] and Tart [32], we refer to these as "altered states of
consciousness", adopting this term to emphasise their dissimilarity to ordinary conscious wakefulness.
Let us describe commonalities shared by altered states of consciousness, which point towards a
potential general definition. First, altered states of consciousness are temporally extended and typically
(but not always) reversible. Second, they are not defined by the presence of specific subjective experiences,
but instead by general and qualitative modifications to the contents of consciousness, including their
experienced intensity [17]. Third, at least some states can be ordered along a hierarchy of levels, from
states of "reduced" consciousness (e.g. general anaesthesia, sleep) to others considered "richer" (e.g. certain
states achieved during meditation or induced by pharmacological means) [33].
A proper definition of what constitutes an altered state of consciousness is, unfortunately, more
elusive than suggested by the examination of these examples. If states of consciousness are transient, then
what is their minimum accepted length? Do qualitative modifications of conscious content apply only to
the sensory domain, or encompass other forms of subjective experience as well? Does a déjà-vu (a brief
episode of eerie familiarity with an unknown past event) qualify as an altered state of consciousness?
What about an orgasm, or the state of pain caused by hitting one’s finger with a hammer? Without doubt,
these examples modify in one way or another the general contents of consciousness, but they are not
commonly considered as altered states of consciousness.
The intuitive notion of "levels" of consciousness is also problematic [34]. We are familiar with the fact
that some states appear to be "more conscious" than others; for instance, ordinary wakefulness would
have a higher conscious level than deep sleep or an absence seizure. But in what sense is deep sleep
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Table 1. Categories of altered states of consciousness
Category Examples Reversibility
Natural or endogenous
deep sleep
dreaming transitory
Pharmacological
general anaesthesia
psychedelic state transitory
Induced by other means
meditation
hypnosis transitory
Pathological
epilepsy
psychotic episodes transitory or permanent
more or less conscious than an absence seizure? Following this logic, how should dreaming, the acute
effects of psychedelic drugs, and the state achieved by expert meditators be ordered along a hypothetical
uni-dimensional hierarchy of levels of consciousness? It seems that altered states of consciousness can
only be subject to partial ordering, with comparisons between certain pairs of states being questionable or
outright meaningless.
These difficulties relate to two main problems. The first problem is granularity: how long is long
enough to qualify as an altered state of consciousness? The second is compositeness: instead of a single
level of intensity, multiple dimensions are likely required for an unambiguous characterisation; however,
it is unclear how many dimensions are needed and how they should be determined [34,35]. A subsidiary
issue related to the granularity problem is whether altered states of consciousness represent discrete states
with sharply defined boundaries, or are more adequately understood as continuous transitions.
Several proposals have been put forward to circumvent these issues and define altered states of
consciousness [16–22]. Here, we adopt perforce a more pragmatic stance: we are interested in altered
states of consciousness lasting enough to be investigated by modern neuroimaging techniques (>10 min).
At the same time, we strive to show that whole-brain models can be sufficiently rich to transcend the
unidimensional characterisation of consciousness in terms of "levels".
For the purposes of this article, we divide altered states of consciousness into the following (neither
exhaustive nor mutually exclusive) categories: natural or endogenous (e.g. the states within the sleep
cycle), induced by pharmacological means (e.g. general anaesthesia, the psychedelic state), induced
by other means (e.g. meditation, hypnosis), caused by pathological processes, either neurological or
psychiatric (e.g. disorders of consciousness, epilepsy, psychotic episodes), and transitory vs. permanent.
3. Top-down signatures of consciousness from brain signals
A major challenge in the study of altered states of consciousness has been to establish empirical
signatures in brain signals that are characteristic of different states, thus allowing us to identify them "from
the outside" – i.e. not depending on self-report or behavioural tasks [13]. Establishing and validating
these signatures also carries significance from a clinical perspective, since they could lead to efficient
and specific biomarkers for certain neuropsychiatric conditions [36,37]. Furthermore, when interpreted
within a broader theory, some of these signatures may also provide new insights about the nature of the
corresponding conscious states, advancing our fundamental understanding of consciousness itself.
In the following, we first provide a broad overview of general aspects of theories of consciousness,
and then illustrate what a signature of consciousness is by reviewing two well-known examples.
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3.1. Functionalist and non-functionalist positions on the mind-brain problem
When we consider the most prominent contemporary theories of consciousness, we find that they
mainly differ in what they take as valid empirical data to be explained by the theory. There are essentially
two positions on this matter, which can be related to the influential division between functionalist
and non-functionalist positions on the mind-brain problem. For a functionalist, the subjective quality
of conscious experience is rejected as a valid target of scientific explanation. According to this view,
most famously articulated by Daniel Dennett in Consciousness Explained [38], only third-person objective
measurements fall into the scope of a science of consciousness. This data is limited to observable behaviour
and neural activity recordings; for instance, whenever an experimental subject claims to be experiencing a
certain shade of blue, the neuroscientist is not tasked with finding how a physical process in the brain
can cause a subjective feeling of blue, but with determining the mechanisms leading the subject to declare
such experience [39]. Non-functionalists, on the other hand, reject this position as a sophisticated form of
behaviourism [40]. According to this view, introspection plays a crucial role in the scientific explanation
of consciousness, because it reveals the very nature of the explanandum itself; any other kind of data
represents, at best, an indirect approximation [41–43]. It is one of the defining features of consciousness,
argue the defenders of this position, that it cannot be illusory [44] since being conscious of something is
precisely what bears that conscious experience into existence [45,46].
When translated into the domain of neuroscience, these positions inform the two most influential
contemporary models of consciousness. The global neuronal workspace theory (GNW) [47,48] links
consciousness with the widespread and sustained propagation of activity in the cortex, serving the
computational function of broadcasting information to be processed by specialised modules [49]. This
theory was developed to explain the neural signatures of consciousness seen in cognitive neuroscience
experiments – in other words, to explain third-person objective data. On the contrary, integrated
information theory (IIT) [50–52] is based on certain first-person qualities of subjective experience, which
are accessed by introspection and can be taken as "postulates" or "axioms" for the theory [52]. This theory
strives to provide a quantitative characterisation of consciousness, as well as to determine the neural
correlates of conscious contents from first principles only (even though concrete predictions may be
computationally intractable [53]). Both theories have been the target of intense criticism [6,54–58], which
can be taken as a sign that the scientific problem of consciousness remains unsolved.
While GWT and IIT are frequently pitted against each other, their predictions for human brains
may still be mutually compatible [59,60]. For our purpose, what these two theories have in common
is that they follow a top-down approach, in the sense that they both focus on abstract computational
or information-theoretical principles, without necessarily specifying how these principles arise as a
consequence of local dynamics within the underlying neural substrate. We argue that it is via detailed
whole-brain modelling that the points of agreement and divergence between theories, and how they relate
to the neurophysiology of the human brain, can and should be studied ahead of possible experiments.
3.2. Examples of signatures of consciousness
Since the conception of NCC, neuroscientists have turned to every available neuroimaging technology
in the search for signatures of consciousness [4,5]. Although many kinds of signatures have been explored
(including some related to metabolic consumption [61] or cortical connectivity [62]), for the purposes of
this article we will focus on signatures measurable with functional neuroimaging tools like MEG, EEG
and fMRI (which can be simulated with the models described in Section 4). In the sequel, we illustrate the
nature and application of signatures of consciousness by elaborating on two well-known examples.
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3.2.1. The entropic brain hypothesis
One of the simplest, yet remarkably powerful, theoretical framework to furnish signatures of
consciousness is Carhart-Harris’ entropic brain hypothesis (EBH) [33,63]. According to the EBH, the
richness of conscious experience depends on the complexity of the underlying population-level neuronal
activity, which determines the repertoire of states available for the brain to explore. Put simply, conscious
states that involve richer experiences might require a more diverse set of brain configurations, which
should leave a traceable footprint to be observed in the entropy, or in the entropy rate2 of the corresponding
brain signals. Following this rationale, the level of consciousness should be proportional (at least within
reasonable range) to the entropy of brain signals.
An effective tool to estimate the entropy rate of a signal is the Lempel-Ziv complexity (LZc) [63–65],
originally conceived as a lossless compression algorithm. The LZc of brain signals has proven to be an
extremely robust signature of consciousness, and has been tested in a breadth of scenarios including
anaesthesia [66], coma [67], sleep [68], epilepsy [69], meditation [70] and the psychedelic state [71,72].
More recently, it has also been used to assess fluctuations of consciousness during normal wakefulness
due to cognitive tasks [73], stress [74], fatigue [75], and music performance or listening [76].
With its impressive track record and wide applicability, LZc stands as a prominent signature of
consciousness to compare across biological and simulated brains. Furthermore, LZc can be used in
tandem with transcranial magnetic stimulation to compute the perturbational complexity index [77], a
clinically-tested marker of consciousness, which can also be used as a test measure for whole-brain models.
3.2.2. Integrated information theory
A strong limitation of standard brain entropy analyses is that they consider only the entropy of
individual signals, without acknowledging the multivariate structure of brain dynamics. An attractive
way of studying interdependencies between brain signals is with tools drawn from integrated information
theory (IIT) [78]. IIT proposes an intimate relationship between consciousness and the ability of a physical
system to be integrated in such a way that is "more that the sum of its parts" – i.e. to display dynamical
properties in the whole that are not observed in any of its parts.
IIT builds on key information-theoretic ideas first presented in the seminal early work of Tononi,
Sporns, and Edelman [79], and has been subject of continuous development since [50–52,80]. Following
Mediano et al. [81], we distinguish between empirical IIT and fundamentalist IIT as two separate branches of
the theory. While fundamentalist IIT has been highly controversial and subject of extensive criticism [53,
82–84], multiple efforts in empirical IIT have been made to overcome the computational challenges of the
theory [85–87].
At the core of empirical applications of IIT is a quantitative measure of integrated information,
typically denoted by Φ. There is currently no agreed-upon Φ measure, although multiple proposals
have been put forward [81] and can be used to understand and compare the dynamical structure of
systems of interest. Detailed procedures describing how to compute different versions of Φ can be found
in Ref. [81]. Although the evidence supporting IIT as a fundamental theory of consciousness has been
contested [88], measures inspired by empirical IIT have proven useful in analysing both empirical [89,90]
as well as simulated [87,91] neural data. Altogether, the family of information-theoretic measures inspired
by empirical IIT provides a valuable toolkit to study the multivariate dynamics of whole-brain models.
2 While the entropy estimates the average uncertainty in a signal, the entropy rate estimates how hard is to predict the next
time-point given its history.
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4. Bottom-up whole-brain models
While human neuroscience research has been increasingly dominated by imaging experiments,
an important complement to this research is provided by computational neuroscience [92]. In effect,
neuroimaging data is usually insufficient to inform the underlying mechanisms at play behind neural
phenomena unfolding at different spatial and temporal scales [93]. Also, since ethical considerations
severely limit direct causal manipulation of human brain activity, most of the neuroimaging literature is
limited to correlational studies.
The application of computational models to neuroimaging data with the purpose of making causal
and mechanistic assertions has been proposed and developed in parallel with different objectives. For
instance, deep neural networks can be used to model information-processing in the brain [94] by comparing
their representational content via second-order isomorphisms (e.g. representational similarity analysis)
[95]. These models can be used to investigate the plausibility of different computational architectures
within cognitive neuroscience [96]. Another example is dynamic causal modelling (DCM), which was
developed to make model-based causal inferences from neuroimaging experiments [97]. DCM is based
on simulating brain signals under the assumption of different causal interactions and then performing
model comparison and selection. Finally, whole-brain models are based on dynamical systems coupled by
large-scale anatomical connectivity networks, and are developed to reproduce the statistics of empirical
brain signals at multiple scales [98]. We also distinguish whole-brain models from attempts to produce
extremely detailed reproductions of large neural circuits (e.g. cortical columns) [99], mainly due to
differences in model complexity.
Whole-brain models provide a practical, ethical, and inexpensive "digital scalpel", which allows
researchers to explore the counterfactual consequences of modifying structural or dynamical aspects of the
brain. More generally, whole-brain models build a bridge from local networked dynamics to the large-scale
patterns of activity that are addressed by theoretical signatures of consciousness. As such, they represent a
valuable tool to narrow the space of mechanistic explanations compatible with the observed neuroimaging
data, including data acquired from subjects undergoing different altered states of consciousness.
In this section, we provide a brief introduction to whole-brain models to the unfamiliar reader,
discussing their various types and the principles behind their tuning to empirical data. Additionally, we
review recent articles where these models have been used to shed light on the neurobiological mechanisms
underlying different altered states of consciousness.
4.1. What are whole-brain models?
Whole-brain models are sets of equations that describe the dynamics and interactions between neural
populations in different brain regions. These models typically focus on the joint evolution of a set of key
biophysical variables using systems of coupled differential equations (although discrete time step models
can also be used, as will be discussed below). These equations can be built from knowledge concerning
the biophysical mechanisms underlying different forms of brain activity, or as phenomenological models
chosen by the kind of dynamics they produce. Then, local dynamics are combined by in vivo estimates
of anatomical connectivity networks. In particular, fMRI, EEG and MEG signals can be used to define
the statistical observables, diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) can provide information about the structural
connectivity between brain regions by means of whole-brain tractography, and PET imaging can inform
on metabolism and produce receptor density maps for a given neuromodulator.
Most whole-brain models are structured around three basic elements:
A. Brain parcellation: A brain parcellation determines the number of regions and the spatial resolution
at which the brain dynamics take place. The parcellation may include cortical, sub-cortical, and
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Bottom-up
Whole-Brain Model for
Conscious Wakefulness
Inputs Model Optimization to Fit Empirical Features
Whole-Brain Models 
for Altered States
+
Tractography
Parcellation
Local Dynamics
Pharmacological
Altered State
Endogenous
Altered State
Pathological
Altered State
Altered States
Brain Recordings
Figure 1. Workflow describing the construction of whole-brain models. First, model inputs are determined
based on anatomical connectivity, a brain parcellation (representing a certain coarse graining), and the
local dynamics (left). Each region defined by the parcellation is endowed with a specific connectivity
profile and local dynamics. Then, the model can be optimised to generate data as similar as possible to the
brain activity observed during conscious wakefulness. Generally, this similarity is determined by certain
statistical properties of the empirical brain signals, which constitute the target observable. The same or
another observable is obtained from subjects during altered states of consciousness and used again as the
target of an optimisation algorithm to infer model parameters. Following a given working hypothesis, the
model for wakeful consciousness can be perturbed in such a way that optimises the similarity between the
target observable for the altered state of consciousness and the data generated by the model. In this way, a
whole-brain model for an altered state of consciousness can be used to test working hypotheses about its
mechanistic underpinnings.
cerebellar regions. Examples of well-known parcellations are the Hagmann parcellation [100], and
the automated anatomical labeling (AAL) atlas [101].
B. Anatomical connectivity matrix: This matrix defines the network of connections between brain
regions. Most studies are based on the human connectome, obtained by estimating the number of
white-matter fibers connecting brain areas from DTI data combined with probabilistic tractography
[28]. For control purposes, randomized versions of the connectome (null hypothesis networks) may
also be employed.
C. Local dynamics: The activity of each brain region is typically determined by the chosen local
dynamics plus interaction terms with other regions. A variety of approaches have been proposed to
model whole-brain dynamics, including cellular automata [102,103], the Ising spin model [104–106],
autoregressive models [107], stochastic linear models [108], non-linear oscillators [109,110], neural
field theory [111,112], neural mass models [113,114], and dynamic mean field models [115–117]. A
detailed review of the different models that can be explored within this context can be found in
[15,29].
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The first two items are guided by available experimental data. In contrast, the choice of local dynamics
is usually driven by the phenomena under study and the epistemological context at which the modelling
effort takes place. Because of this hybrid nature, whole-brain models constructed following this process
are sometimes called semi-empirical models. Whole-brain models can be constructed from in-house code, or
more easily from platforms such as The Virtual Brain (https://www.thevirtualbrain.org/tvb/zwei) [30].
4.2. Examples
We showcase two models that have been frequently used to assess mechanistic hypotheses behind
both pharmacologically and physiologically-induced altered states of consciousness: the dynamic mean
field model [115,116,118], and the model comprised by Stuart-Landau non-linear coupled oscillators
[109,110,119]. These examples are chosen to represent a biologically realistic model (dynamic mean field)
and a phenomenological model (Stuart-Landau oscillators); moreover, these models have been applied to
different states of consciousness, making them pertinent in the context of the present discussion.
4.2.1. Dynamic mean field (DMF) model
In this approach, the neuronal activity in a given brain region is represented by a set of differential
equations describing the interaction between inhibitory and excitatory pools of neurons [120]. The DMF
presents three variables for each population: the synaptic current, the firing rate, and the synaptic gating,
where the excitatory coupling is mediated by NMDA receptors and the inhibitory by GABA-A receptors.
The interregional coupling is considered excitatory-to-excitatory only, and a feedback inhibition control
in the excitatory current equation is included [115]. The output variable of the model is the firing rate of
the excitatory population that is then included in a nonlinear hemodynamical model [121] to simulate the
regional BOLD signals.
The key idea behind the mean-field approximation is to reduce the high-dimensional randomly
interacting elements to a system of elements treated as independent. Then, an average external field
effectively replaces the interaction with all other elements. Thus, this approach represents the average
activity of an homogeneous population of neurons by the activity of a single unit of this class, reducing in
this way the dimensionality of the system. In spite of these approximations, the dynamic mean field model
incorporates a detailed biophysical description of the local dynamics, which increases the interpretability
of the model parameters.
4.2.2. Stuart-Landau non-linear oscillator model
This approach builds on the idea that neural activity can exhibit – under suitable conditions –
self-sustained oscillations at the population level [102,109,110,119,122]. In this model, the dynamical
behaviour is represented by a non-linear oscillator with the addition of Gaussian noise at the proximity
of a Hopf bifurcation [123]. By changing a single model parameter (i.e. bifurcation parameter) across
a critical value, the model gives rise to three qualitatively different asymptotic behaviours: harmonic
oscillations, fixed point dynamics governed by noise, and intermittent complex oscillations when the
bifurcation parameter is close to the bifurcation (i.e. at dynamical criticality). Correspondingly, the model
is determined by two parameters: the bifurcation parameter of the Hopf bifurcation in the local dynamics,
and the coupling strength factor that scales the anatomical connectivity matrix. In contrast to the DMF
model, coupled Stuart-Landau non-linear oscillators constitute a phenomenological model, i.e. the model
parameter does not map into any biophysically relevant variable. In this case, the model is attractive due to
its conceptual simplicity, which is given by its capacity to produce three qualitatively different behaviours
of interest by changing a single parameter.
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4.3. How to fit whole-brain models to neuroimaging data?
Whole-brain models are tuned to reproduce specific features of brain activity. The way in which this
is ensured is via optimisation of the free parameters in the local dynamics plus the coupling strength.
Parameter values are usually selected such that the model matches a certain statistical observable computed
from the experimental data.
For example, the DMF whole-brain model introduces one parameter to scale the strength of the
connectivity matrix, usually known as the global coupling parameter. During model training, an exhaustive
exploration of this parameter is conducted over a wide range of values. The parameter value is chosen
to maximise the similarity between the observable computed from simulated and experimental data.
For instance, the parameter can be chosen to minimise the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance between the
functional connectivity dynamics (FCD) distributions of the simulated and real data [115].
This kind of brute-force optimisation is employed when the number of free parameters is low (i.e. two
or three). However, it is also possible to separately optimise the parameters governing the local dynamics
of each node, which dramatically increases the dimensionality of the search space, and thus requires
more elaborated optimisation techniques, such as gradient descent [124] or genetic algorithms [119]. The
advantage of considering a small set of global parameters resides in its simplicity and scalability, but
unfortunately it misses the dynamical heterogeneity among brain regions. These heterogeneities can be
modelled at the expense of increasing the parameter space. Essentially, the choice of model complexity (i.e.
the number of free parameters) depends on the scientific question and its associated hypotheses.
Since adding more free parameters increases the computational cost of the optimisation procedure, it
becomes critical to choose parameters reflecting variables that are considered relevant, either from a general
neurobiological perspective or in the specific context of the altered state under investigation. Depending
on the latter, the parameters could be divided into groups that are allowed to change independently based
on different criteria, including structural lesion maps, receptor densities, local gene expression profiles,
and parcellations that reflect the neural substrate of certain cognitive functions, among others.
After choosing the parcellation, the equations governing the local dynamics and their interaction
terms, the interregional coupling given by the structural connectivity matrix, and selecting a criteria to
constrain the dimensionality of the parameter space, the last critical step is to define the observable which
will be used to construct the target function for the optimisation procedure. As mentioned above, one
possibility is to optimise the model to reproduce the statistics of functional connectivity dynamics (FCD).
Perhaps a more straightforward option is to optimise the "static" functional connectivity matrix computed
over the duration of the complete experiment, an approach followed by Refs. [119] and [110], among others.
Other observables related to the collective dynamics can be obtained from the synchrony and metastability,
as defined in the context of the Kuramoto model [110,125]. In general, any meaningful computation
summarising the spatiotemporal structure of a neuroimaging dataset constitutes a valid observable, with
the adequate choice depending on the scientific question and the altered state of consciousness under
study.
Since different observables can be defined, reflecting both stationary and dynamic aspects of brain
activity, a natural question arises: is a given whole-brain model capable of simultaneously reproducing
multiple observables within reasonable accuracy? We consider this question to be very relevant, yet at
the same time it has been comparatively understudied. For instance, a review of articles using coupled
Stuart-Landau oscillators shows that dynamical observables are reproduced when the oscillators operate
at dynamical criticality (i.e. near the Hopf bifurcation), yet stationary observables (such as the "static"
functional connectivity") are best reproduced for other parameter combinations [110,119,124]. This suggests
that exploring bifurcations with higher co-dimensions or even chaotic dynamics unfolding in the proximity
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of strange attractors could enable the simultaneous optimisation of several observables, a possibility that
is discussed later in this article.
Finally, some natural candidates for observables to be fitted by whole-brain models are precisely
the high-level signatures of consciousness put forward by theoretical predictions, such as the different
measures of information integration, complexity and entropy that were reviewed in the previous section.
The objective is to fit whole-brain models using these signatures as target functions and then assess the
biological plausibility of the optimal model parameters, which allows to test the consistency of these
signatures from a bottom-up perspective. Alternatively, signatures of consciousness can be computed
from the model –initially fitted to other observables– and compared to the empirical results. Again, this
highlights the need to understand which kind of local dynamics allow the simultaneous reproduction of
multiple observables derived from experimental data.
4.4. Whole-brain models applied to the study of consciousness
The available evidence suggests that states of consciousness are not determined by activity in
individual brain areas, but emerge as a global property of the brain, which in turn is shaped by its
large-scale structural and functional organisation [48,126,127]. According to this view, whole-brain
models provide a fertile ground to explore how global signatures of different states of consciousness
emerge from local dynamics. This promise is already being met, as shown by several recent articles
[33,102,109,110,118,119,122,128].
For example, transitions from wakefulness into other states, such as the different stages of human
sleep or the state induced by general anaesthetics, have been interpreted as phase transitions in neural
mass models and in terms of the collective dynamics of coupled Stuart-Landau oscillators [109,110,119].
Noise-driven systems at dynamical criticality result in dynamics compatible with neuroimaging recordings
obtained during conscious wakefulness, and departures from these dynamics better reflect different states
of unconsciousness [33,102,122,128–130]. As will be discussed in the following section, the stochastic
switching between different attractors results in the kind of metastable behaviour that is characteristic of
conscious wakefulness [131]. These results are consistent with the hypothesis of statistical criticality (e.g.
proximity to a second order phase transition) as a fundamental principle of brain organization [132]. Even
though parallels can be drawn between statistical and dynamical criticality, we limit our discussion to the
former since the relationship between both concepts is complicated and beyond the scope of this article.
Following the example of the PCI index (which is obtained by perturbing the cortex with TMS
and measuring the complexity of the elicited response) [77], whole-brain models can be systematically
"perturbed" by incorporating changes into the dynamical equations. The in silico rehearsal of perturbations
is useful to test hypotheses concerning which parts of the model are essential to produce different
signatures of consciousness. A prominent example of this perturbational analysis applied to whole-brain
models can be found in a recent article [118] where a whole-brain model based on coupled Stuart-Landau
oscillators was fitted to empirical fMRI data acquired from subjects during deep sleep. The model was
then modified by changing local bifurcation parameters with a greedy optimization algorithm, which
unveiled the optimal perturbation profile to increase the similarity to a target brain state (in this case,
conscious wakefulness). Another relevant example of this perturbational approach is found in Ref. [116],
where a transition was shaped by the effects of neuromodulation. The authors investigated the transition
from resting state activity acquired under a placebo condition towards the altered state of consciousness
induced by the serotonin 2A receptor agonist lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). A dynamical mean-field
model was fitted to minimize the difference between FCD of the simulated activity and the empirical data
of subjects in the placebo condition, which allowed to determine the optimal value of the global coupling
parameter. Then, an empirical map of 5-HT2A receptor density was used to modulate the synaptic gain,
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effectively simulating the heterogeneous effects of LSD across the whole brain. As a control, the authors
showed that using maps for the density of other serotonin receptor sub-types decreased the goodness of
fit, thus corroborating the well-known association between LSD and the 5-HT2A receptor.
Another interesting possibility is to assess the consequences of stimulation protocols that are
impossible to apply in vivo. An example is the Perturbative Integration Latency Index (PILI) [122], which
measures the latency of the return to baseline after a strong perturbation that generates dynamical changes
detectable over long temporal scales (on the order of tens of seconds). This in silico perturbative approach
allows to systematically investigate how the response of brain activity upon external perturbations is
indicative of the state of consciousness, providing new mechanistic insights into the capacity of the human
brain to integrate and segregate information over different time scales.
In Ref. [119], the authors used a model of coupled Stuart-Landau oscillators to model the regional
changes in dynamical stability that occur during the wake-sleep cycle. Brain regions belonging to different
resting state networks (RSN) [133] were considered as independent sources of variation for the local
model parameters. Using a stochastic optimisation algorithm, the authors represented the transition from
wakefulness into deep sleep as a sequence of changes in the stability of brain activity within canonical RSN.
A follow-up paper extended this analysis to other states of reduced consciousness (including anaesthesia
and patients suffering from disorders of consciousness) and investigated the possibility of inducing
transitions to conscious wakefulness by means of simulated periodic stimulation at the resonant frequency
of each node in the model [134].
5. Proposed research agenda
5.1. Motivation
Consciousness research is in need of mechanistic accounts to explain why brain signals recorded
during different states of consciousness can be consistently characterised by the presence of certain global
signatures. Our motivation is not the replacement of the explanations of these signatures provided by
theories such as GNW or IIT. Instead, we aim to put forward a framework for their investigation from
a bottom-up perspective. Eventually, we expect to converge on the high-level explanations furnished
by some of these theories. Our inspiration is partially drawn from statistical thermodynamics, which
provides a clear example of how the bottom-up and top-down perspectives can converge into a consistent
picture of physical reality. Importantly, in this case the resulting theory remained useful both as a set
of phenomenological principles and computational rules (i.e. classical thermodynamics), but also as a
framework to establish connections between those principles and the rules governing the microscopic
properties of matter.
Following this concept, we strive to use our current knowledge about neural dynamics to produce
models whose behaviour agrees with the constraints of some theories formulated from a top-down
perspective, while weakening the support for others as a result of inconsistent predictions. Here it becomes
important to clarify our intended meaning of the word "prediction". When it comes to complex systems
such as the brain, predictions are considered possible only in a statistical sense [132]. Accordingly, we do
not expect that the time series generated by computational models directly correspond to their empirical
counterparts; however, we can expect a match for statistical observables.
This motivates our study of altered states of consciousness, since their extended temporal duration
guarantees the possibility of extracting robust statistical characterisations from multivariate neuroimaging
recordings. An example of this characterisation is the matrix derived from computing all pairwise
correlations between regional time series, which is considered a marker of inter-areal functional
connectivity (sometimes referred to as the "functional connectome") [135]. We consider that whole-brain
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computational models have been developed to a point where they contain sufficient empirical ingredients
to predict the second-order statistics of brain activity. Thus, the field is ripe to welcome a framework which
may provide solid ground to investigate signatures of consciousness from a mechanistic perspective.
The following example is aimed to motivate the proposal we put forward in the next section. We
know that activity within a network of brain regions including the fronto-parietal cortex is correlated
with conscious experience [8,62,136–138]. On the other hand, conscious experience is also characterised by
signatures such as information integration, entropy and neural complexity. Is it possible to determine the
causal role that these anatomical regions play in the generation of these signatures of consciousness by
means of computational models?
5.2. Proposal
The principal idea behind our proposal is that whole-brain models can be used to test hypotheses
concerning the mechanistic and causal underpinnings of different states of consciousness. We do not
expect that whole-brain models are sufficiently advanced to identify those precise mechanisms; however,
we propose that they can contribute to narrow the space of possible mechanistic explanations, therefore
complementing current theories of consciousness from a bottom-up perspective.
The fundamental objective of this research program is to foster the development of this novel
approach to study altered states of consciousness. Our framework rests upon the complementary nature
of three key ingredients: experimental data obtained through neuroimaging experiments, theoretical
approaches to characterise signatures of consciousness, and bottom-up whole-brain computational models.
The application of modern neuroimaging techniques to the study of signatures of consciousness has
provided very effective tools to predict the brain activity patterns that are associated with different states
of consciousness. However, as René Thom famously stated "to predict is not to explain" [139]. Hence, we
now turn to the discussion of how models could bridge the gap between prediction and explanation.
The proposed framework to model altered states of consciousness is based on adjusting three
independent variables (see Figure 2):
A. Connectome: Is the state of consciousness implicated with local or diffuse structural abnormalities?
This is frequently the case for neurological conditions such as coma and post-comatose disorders of
consciousness (e.g. unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, minimally conscious state) [140]. Also,
subtler structural modifications can be implicated in certain psychiatric conditions presenting
episodes of altered consciousness, such as different forms of schizophrenia [141].
B. Modulation: Is the state of consciousness a consequence of neuromodulatory changes, either
endogenous or induced externally by means of pharmacological manipulation? Two typical examples
are the altered states of consciousness induced by psychedelics/dissociatives, which are linked to
agonism/antagonism at serotonin/glutamate receptors [142]. Certain psychiatric conditions are
believed to arise as a consequence of neuromodulatory imbalances, e.g. dopaminergic imbalances are
believed to play an important role in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia [143]. Most anaesthetic
drugs reduce the complexity of the brain activity by targeting specific neuromodulatory sites, such
as those activated by gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) [144]. Finally, sleep is a state of reduced
consciousness triggered by activity in monoaminergic neurons with diffuse projections throughout
the brain [145].
C. Dynamics: Is the altered state of consciousness captured by well-understood dynamical mechanisms?
Does the model include parametrically controlled external perturbations? While changes in the
local excitation/inhibition balance are ultimately caused by neurochemical processes, they are best
understood in terms of their dynamical consequences. States such as epilepsy, deep sleep and general
anaesthesia are believed to involve unbalanced excitation/inhibition [146]. In some cases, dynamics
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Figure 2. Representation of the three key variables that can be modified to construct whole-brain models
of different altered states of consciousness. These variables correspond to local dynamics, anatomical
connectivity, and priors related to neuromodulatory systems necessary to accommodate physiological,
pathological and pharmacologically-induced altered states of consciousness. Certain states may require
the modification of multiple variables; for instance, focal seizures and propofol-induced anaesthesia are
both associated with low complexity patterns of brain activity, yet in the first case these dynamics reflect
structural abnormalities, while in the second case they reflect the activation of certain inhibitory pathways.
may be sufficiently idiosyncratic to be captured by low dimensional phenomenological models, as
in the case of certain forms of epileptic activity [147]. Finally, local dynamics could be modified to
simulate the effects of external neurostimulation [118,134].
Depending on the answers to these questions, the whole-brain model should incorporate changes to
anatomical connectivity, local dynamics, or include empirical receptor density maps to add a new layer of
neurobiological detail.
5.3. What can we learn?
The dynamics of whole-brain models can be perturbed arbitrarily. This is significant since it allows
to explore different mechanisms leading to the observed empirical dynamics (as described in a previous
paragraph) and to explore how external stimulation can force transitions between states of consciousness,
including the clinically relevant case of displacing whole-brain models from unconscious states towards
wakefulness [118,134]. Therapeutic alternatives to accelerate the recovery of DOC patients are scarce,
and while some studies support the therapeutic role of external electrical stimulation [148], very little
is known about the optimal choice of stimulation sites and parameters. Whole-brain models could be
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useful for the optimization of stimulation protocols, as well as for assisting in clinical decision making.
Localized stimulation and/or resection of neural tissue are surgical alternatives to treat certain severe
forms of epilepsy, and whole-brain models have been explored with success to predict the outcome
of these interventions [149]. The same concept could apply to the development and in silico testing
of new pharmaceuticals to treat psychiatric conditions, where whole-brain models could be used to
reverse-engineer the optimal receptor affinity profiles required to restore statistical signatures of healthy
brain dynamics. Finally, the combination of data produced by whole-brain models and machine learning
classifiers could be useful for data augmentation in the context of automated diagnosis of rare neurological
diseases [150], and to generate input for deep learning architectures (e.g. variational autoencoders) capable
of representing altered states of consciousness as trajectories within a low dimensionality latent space.
[151].
5.4. Case study: modelling neural entropy increases induced by psychedelics
To further highlight what we can learn from whole-brain models, we discuss an illustrative example of
a bottom-up model that successfully matches a global signature of altered conscious [152]. Using the DMF
model optimised to fit the FCD of placebo and LSD conditions [116], a significant entropy increase of brain
signals was found in LSD vs. placebo as a consequence of simulated 5-HT2A receptor activation. Thus, the
model was capable of identifying a low-level (i.e. molecular scale) mechanism leading to increased neural
entropy, which is a robust signature of the psychedelic state [33,63].
Since activation of the 5-HT2A receptor is causally implicated with the conscious state induced by
serotonergic psychedelics [142,153,154], the effect of the drug was modelled as a local change in the
non-linearity of the regional firing rate. This change was proportional to the local density of 5-HT2A
receptors as determined by PET imaging. Brain entropy increases during the psychedelic state were the
result of heterogeneous changes in the entropy of the regional firing rates (i.e. some regions increased
while others decreased their entropy). These changes in firing rate entropy depended both on the local
anatomical connectivity and the 5-HT2A receptor density.
Thus, starting from local dynamics describing the behaviour of coupled excitatory and inhibitory pools
of neurons, and introducing a perturbation which reflects serotonergic activation, the model provided
a bottom-up confirmation of 5-HT2A activation as the source of increased neural entropy during the
psychedelic state. In the context of Fig. 2, the model adopted changes in local dynamics (bottom left)
informed by empirical maps of 5-HT2A receptor density (bottom right).
6. Future directions
6.1. What should be the "bottom" of bottom-up models?
The question of the ultimate substrate of consciousness is part of a long-standing philosophical debate,
with positions including functionalism (the substrate is irrelevant insofar it instantiates the adequate set of
causal relationships) [38], biological naturalism (the view that consciousness arises as a consequence of
biochemical processes in the brain) [155], and proposals of consciousness as a manifestation of quantum
mechanics [156]. Even though we choose to sidestep this complicated discussion, our modest aim of
building bottom-up models of brain activity still requires the specification of some physical or biological
substrate, which in turn determines the level of realism displayed by the equations that govern local
dynamics.
Many signatures of consciousness are directly related to the global complexity of brain dynamics,
reflecting the widespread hypothesis that consciousness plays an integrative role in the brain [127].
According to this hypothesis, consciousness could be considered a dynamical process "gluing" together
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the output of specialised neural circuits. While tampering with these circuits could modify some specific
contents of consciousness, only the disruption of large-scale neural communication would result in
a state of altered or reduced consciousness. Since this view disregards the contribution of specific
computations that are implemented in local neural circuitry, we could expect that bottom-up models
capable of reproducing an adequate set of canonical dynamics3 will suffice to span the spectrum of
signatures of altered consciousness. Conversely, it could be that the large-scale dynamics that support
inter-areal communication at the same time interact and shape local information processing, and vice-versa.
In this case, we expect that increasingly complex and biologically realistic models will be needed to advance
with our proposal.
This crucial point results in a ramification within our proposal to investigate altered states of
consciousness using whole-brain models. On one hand, models could be enriched by increasingly detailed
and sophisticated sources of empirical information with the purpose of linking signatures of consciousness
to the biophysical details of neural activity. This direction is already suggested by studies modelling the
effects of 5-HT2A activation using receptor density maps produced by PET imaging [116,152]. Following
this direction, future models could be expanded to include fine-grained details of local wiring patterns,
different cell types and their projections, as well as their interaction with diffuse neuromodulatory systems.
However, as complexity is increased, the conceptual interpretation of models becomes less clear. On the
other hand, it is known that dynamical systems may exhibit canonical behaviours when their solutions
undergo changes in their qualitative behaviour (i.e. bifurcations) [157]. Recent work fitting whole-brain
models to the results of fMRI experiments suggests that bifurcations play a key role in the reproduction of
the second-order statistics of empirical data [102,109,110,119,122]. This occurs because noisy dynamics
close to a bifurcation point switches between different attractors, producing rich and complex dynamics
typical of brain signals. This observation raises the question of whether more complex models reproduce
the statistics of empirical observables by virtue of their universal behaviour near bifurcation points, or as a
consequence of their stationary solutions away from dynamical criticality.
6.2. Transitions between canonical dynamics as primitives to construct whole-brain models
Contrary to the dictum by Norbert Wiener ("The best material model of a cat is another, or preferably the same,
cat") we propose that even if vast sources of biological information can be incorporated into whole-brain
models, striving for such level of detail defeats the purpose of unveiling concrete and interpretable
mechanisms underlying signatures of consciousness. Thus, we suggest that models could be classified by
the kind of large-scale activity patterns they are capable of generating. In other words, we propose that
the "bottom" of bottom-up models should not be related to the scale of the biological substrate, but to the
minimal set of simple dynamical behaviours necessary to reproduce a certain signature of consciousness.
Paralleling the definition of NCC given by Crick and Koch [4,5], we could introduce the "dynamical
correlates of consciousness" (DCC); but we opt to not introduce yet another acronym in an already crowded
field.
Interestingly, Batterman has suggested that multiple realizability, the "metaphysical mystery" that
troubled Jerry Fodor, among other great philosophers of the mind, is as mysterious as the observation that
physical matter behaves in ways which are entirely independent from the vast majority of its details [158].
For a typical example consider a pendulum, whose behaviour is described by the same differential equation
regardless of the colour of the swinging bob. Furthermore, in the small amplitude regime all systems with
3 Here, canonical dynamics refers to dynamics in the proximity of a class of topologically equivalent attractors. The reader should
think of the result of simplifying the equations into the normal forms corresponding to the bifurcations present in the system
[157].
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an U-shaped energy landscape can be approximated by an harmonic solution, with examples ranging
from electrical circuits to orbital mechanics. Northoff and colleagues have argued that the spatiotemporal
dynamics constitutes the fundamental substrate underlying human consciousness [159], which resonates
with Batterman’s proposal, as well as with our suggestion that the "bottom" (i.e. the maximum necessary
level of detail) is best understood as a comprehensive list of the dynamical behaviours that the system can
display. We postpone taking a stance towards these metaphysical speculations, and proceed to develop
these ideas in the context of building useful bottom-up models in the future.
A set of qualitatively different dynamics is provided in Fig. 3, illustrating a Takens-Bogdanov
bifurcation diagram [160]. Whole-brain models can be constructed by coupling the dynamics given as an
equation in the inset (left panel) either by variables x, y, or both. The equation and its solutions depend on
two parameters, α and β. Under the weak coupling assumption, modifying these two parameters will
result in qualitative changes in the local dynamics (where these changes occur in the diagram could be
modified by the coupling strength). For uncoupled dynamics, parameter combinations at points a, c, e
result in a stable constant level of activity (i.e. fixed point dynamics). Parameter combinations at points b,
d, f give rise to oscillations of different spectral content (i.e. limit cycles).
In the right panel of Fig. 3, the solutions can be visualised either as time series or as two dimensional
diagrams known as phase portraits, where each axis corresponds to a variable (in this case, x and y) and
the arrows stand for the vector field (in this case, x˙ and y˙). Insofar the bifurcations in the left panel of Fig.
3 are not crossed, changes in the parameters α and β only result in deformations of the phase portrait,
representing solutions that are equivalent in a qualitative sense (more formally, the phase portraits are
topologically equivalent). Crossing a bifurcation results in an abrupt change that cannot be understood as
a small deformation of the phase portrait, implying a qualitatively different behaviour of the system.
The richness of coupling this kind of simple dynamical models stems from the possibility of inducing
stochastic transitions across bifurcations by incorporating an additive noise term. In this way, dynamics
switch intermittently between two qualitatively different solutions. In the case of the Hopf bifurcation,
for instance, noise-driven dynamics at the bifurcation point are neither stable nor oscillatory, but present
complex amplitude fluctuations [124]. The noise-driven exploration of a system’s attractor space is a
mainstay of computational neuroscience [161] and could represent an useful methodological resource to
build whole-brain models to explore altered states of consciousness.
Following the pioneering work of Deco and colleagues [124], the most frequently explored transition
is between stable noise-driven dynamics and self-sustained harmonic oscillations, corresponding to the
Hopf bifurcation (vertical red line in Fig. 3), which appears in Stuart-Landau nonlinear oscillators. At
the bifurcation point, dynamics show the kind of complexity that is compatible with certain signatures
of consciousness, with departures from this point being reported for states of reduced consciousness
such as sleep and anaesthesia [110,118,119,122] (as it is clear from Fig. 3, however, this bifurcation is only
one among multiple possibilities). The upper panel of Fig. 4 illustrates this situation by presenting the
phase space and temporal evolution of a noise-driven Stuart-Landau nonlinear oscillator near dynamical
criticality. The signal evolves with complex amplitude fluctuations as noise drives the dynamics across
the bifurcation. Also, at dynamical criticality small fluctuations tend to be amplified [110,124], thus
whole-brain models far from criticality reproduce the lack of sustained and complex responses to external
perturbations seen in states of reduced consciousness [77].
The inclusion of noise in whole-brain models raises questions concerning the mechanisms that
endow biological systems with stochastic dynamics [161]. Again, we postpone these difficult questions
in lieu of more practical considerations, and propose that noise-driven equilibrium dynamics increase
interpretability at the expense of two main shortcomings. First, parameter fine-tuning is required to pose
dynamics near dynamical criticality. As discussed above, optimisation procedures can be applied to obtain
the parameters which best reproduce certain empirical observables. However, the biological variables
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Figure 3. Left panel: Takens-Bogdanov bifurcation diagram, which is obtained by changing parameters α
and β in the normal form equations (included as an inset). Depending on the combination of parameters,
this simple dynamical system can present qualitatively different solutions. The green line stands for a
saddle-node bifurcation, where two equilibrium points collide and disappear. Crossing the red line results
in a Hopf bifurcation, where dynamics switch from a fixed point to stable harmonic oscillations. The dashed
line represents a homoclinic bifurcation, where the limit cycle collides with a saddle point resulting again
in steady dynamics. Right panel: The phase portraits a-f illustrate the dynamics at different regions of the
bifurcation diagram, with individual trajectories highlighted in red and presented both as curves in phase
space and as time series. a) Stable fixed point, b) Self-sustained harmonic oscillation after the appearance
of a stable limit cycle, c) Three fixed points appear due to a saddle-node bifurcation, resulting in a stable
fixed point, d) One of the stable fixed points loses its stability and dynamics undergo a Hopf bifurcation, e)
The limit cycle undergoes a homoclinic bifurcation, f) A saddle-node on a limit cycle (SNIC) bifurcation
occurs, resulting in periodic dynamics with complex spectral content. For a detailed description of the
Takens-Bogdanov bifurcation see Ref. [160]. Left panel adapted from Ref. [162].
captured by the optimal combination of parameters could change upon small perturbations, leading to
models that always predict intrinsically unstable states of consciousness. The second problem is that
once parameters are optimised to reproduce a certain observable, other different observables could be
poorly captured by the model, thus questioning the extent to which the model is adequately describing
the empirical data. We propose that both problems could be simultaneously addressed by exploring
non-stochastic models of chaotic coupled oscillators, such as Rossler oscillators. In this model, dynamics
unfold near a strange attractor with positive Lyapunov exponent for a comparatively ample range of
parameters [163]. Thus, complex dynamics do not depend on a bifurcation parameter taking a precise
value, but instead arise over an extended range of parameter values. This kind of phenomenological
models of whole-brain activity is comparatively understudied, and could represent a valuable target for
future developments.
7. Final remarks
The history of science shows an intensive ongoing debate about the position of scientific inquires with
respect to the study of consciousness. As a matter of fact, until recently the largest part of the scientific
community did not consider consciousness as a suitable topic for investigation. While the ultimate nature
of consciousness is still full of mysteries, it is evident that deepening our knowledge of the mechanistic,
statistical, and dynamical relationships within the brain in its different possible states of consciousness can
only increase our understanding of the relationship between mind and body.
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Figure 4. Upper panel: Phase space of a single Stuart-Landau nonlinear oscillator near dynamical criticality
(Hopf bifurcation) with an additive noise term. The radius of the limit cycle fluctuates unpredictably,
resulting in complex signal amplitude modulations. Bottom panel: Phase space of a chaotic Rossler oscillation
in a regime with positive Lyapunov exponent, without the addition of noise. Dynamics unfold in the
proximity of a strange attractor, which results in complex but deterministic dynamics.
A key factor supporting the modern discipline of consciousness research is the extraordinary
development of neuroimaging technologies that occurred over the last decades, which plays a similar
fundamental role than the one played by telescopes in the discovery of the nature of the solar system.
However, making progress in the problem of consciousness not only depends on technological advances,
but also on our capacity to explore and chart the contents and boundaries of consciousness itself.
Consciousness research needs neuroimaging as much as any other branch of human neuroscience, but also
needs to devise and explore new methods to induce altered states of consciousness, and to break through
arbitrary regulatory restrictions preventing the exploration of certain older but very powerful research
tools [164,165].
These technological advances, matched with increases in computational capability, and a renewed
appreciation of the role that altered states of consciousness play in scientific research, have prepared a
fertile ground for whole-brain models to open a new window of research possibilities. In effect, while
much progress has been made during the last decades in the problem of identifying top-down signatures
of consciousness, most of these tools have not yet reached a stage of maturity to allow clinical applications.
We expect that pursuing the problem from a different perspective will be invigorating for the field as a
whole, increasing the appreciation for the role that low-level biological mechanisms play in the emergence
of high-level signatures of consciousness.
Consciousness research is not alone in its need for low-level mechanistic explanations. The project
of formulating psychiatric diagnosis in biological terms [166] will require a systematic exploration of
the low-level mechanisms giving rise to the behavioural manifestations of mental disorders [167,168].
We expect that many of the ideas and methods here proposed will seamlessly translate into the field of
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computational psychiatry, even for the study of disorders which do not include altered consciousness as a
defining feature (e.g. depression).
In the same way that scientific inquiry has eventually succeeded explaining seemingly mysterious
phenomena such as heat (in terms of kinetic considerations), combustion (in terms of chemical reactions)
and genes (in terms of molecular replication), it is reasonable to expect that consciousness will also be
explainable someday in mechanistic terms. If this is to happen, the perspective of bottom-up modelling is
likely to play a crucial role, as it was the case for the three aforementioned examples. It is our hope that the
present proposal will serve both as an encouragement and as a roadmap to invest future research efforts in
the computational modelling of altered states of consciousness.
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Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
NCC Neural correlates of consciousness
DMF Dynamic mean field
fMRI Functional magnetic resonance imaging
BOLD Blood oxygen level–dependent
PET Positron emission tomography
DTI Diffusion tensor imaging
EEG Electroencephalography
MEG Magnetoencephalography
IIT Integrated Information Theory
GNW Global neuronal workspace
EBH Entropic brain hypothesis
LZc Lempel-Ziv complexity
FCD Functional connectivity dynamics
PCI Perturbational complexity index
TMS Transcranial magnetic stimulation
PILI Perturbative Integration Latency Index
LSD Lysergic acid diethylamide
AAL Automated anatomical labelling
DOC Disorder of consciousness
GABA Gamma-aminobutyric acid
RSN Resting-state networks
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